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            Tim BEAL 
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Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand)
   Abe Shinzo's succeeding Koizumi Jun'ichiro as Japanese Prime Minister in September 2006 
provides a suitable occasion for a brief assessment of Japan's standing and image in the region. 
This paper examines the dilemmas facing Japan in her pursuit of `soft power'. Joseph Nye has dif-
ferentiated between, and contrasted, `soft power' (the ability to get what you want by attracting and 
persuading others to adopt your goals) and `hard power', the use of military and economic might. 
Nye argues that soft power is not merely often more effective than hard power, but it is also often 
diminished by excessive reliance on the other power. Japan has, in the past, been charged with 
being an `economic animal' with scant regard to good neighborliness. If present trends towards 
becoming a `normal' state continue, then military power will complement her economic power. 
But at what cost? Japan's relations with her neighbors are worse than they have been for a long 
time. Although Japan has huge potential to generate soft power it often sacrifices this in pursuit 
of hard power. In addition, too much attention is paid to the domestic debate about the nature of 
Japan, and its place in the world, without sufficient consideration of the effect this has on foreign, 
especially East Asian, opinion. Public opinion polls reveal a general level of hostility to Japan in 
the region. This paper analyses these issues by focusing on Japan's relations with the Korean pen-
insula, and with China, within the broader context of global relations. In particular it examines the 
textbook issue and official visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Finally, it examines the reaction to Abe's 
accession to the premiership and current predictions as to the degree to which he follow or diverge 
from Koizumi's path.
Textbooks 
   The textbooks issue, which has bedeviled Japan's relations with her Asian neighbors since 
the early 1980s has flared up again.' In response, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOFA) 
has recently commissioned Japan Echo to set up a website specifically to present the Japanese 
case. Japan Echo is a private company which functions as a de-facto public relations organ for the 
government and has long published English-language translations from Japanese magazines in an 
attempt to reach the American audience.2 The site (http://www je-kaleidoseope.jp.) was launched 
24 August 2005 and, according to MOFA, was necessary because, "Neighboring countries have 
begun to have increased interest in the content of the history textbooks used in Japanese junior 
high schools. Much of the discussion heard from these countries, however, is not based on accurate 
understanding of Japan's history textbooks. Publication under this project is intended to promote 
understanding by foreign countries of the real picture of Japan's history textbooks and history edu-
cation, by introducing in translation what is actually written in its junior high school textbooks." 
The press release says that this stage the website offers partial translations in Chinese and Korean
1 Prideaux 2005. 
2 MOFA 2005.
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and MOFA intends to add English later.' This sequence of languages is clearly a reflection of the 
fact that while Japanese history textbooks are a controversial issue in East Asia, there is surpris-
ingly little interest in the US. 
   The school textbooks issue has deep symbolic importance because not merely does it illustrate 
an attitude towards the past that most East Asians (and many, perhaps most, Japanese themselves) 
find unacceptable, and inform present attitudes and policies, but it also threatens to build this into 
the future through the education system. Paradoxically, although the symbolic impact is high, the 
distortions of the textbooks are neither unusual nor extreme. Americans textbooks, for instance, 
with their strong tone of triumphalism, are much more nationalistic than the Japanese.' Just as 
history is written by the victors, so do school textbooks reflect national pride, or at least that of 
ruling elites and this happens, not surprisingly, in Korea and China as much as anywhere else.' 
Indeed textbooks elsewhere come under little critical scrutiny, but in Japan there has been wide and 
deep opposition to the efforts of right-wing groups to revise the history of Japanese colonialism.' 
Moreover, in 2004 only 16 junior high schools had adopted the 2001 version of the `New History 
Textbook', and that represented just 0.097 percent of the school population.7 Whether the 2005 
editions (eight of them) will do better is as yet unknown. In a sense it does not matter. It is not the 
actual uptake that captures media, and hence, popular in opinion, but that have appeared with what 
seems official approval. As the Seoul newspaper Chosun Ilbo put it, in commenting on Koizumi's 
term in office, "During his tenure, Abe's predecessor Junichiro Koizumi kept visiting the militarist 
Yasukuni Shrine, and his administration distorted history in textbooks and claimed territorial rights 
to Korea's Dokdo islets, thereby causing incessant conflict with Korea and China."8 
   The euphemisms and contrivances of the textbooks are not in themselves exceptional- we see 
spin doctors around the world do that same thing daily, changing `invasions' into `interventions' 
and excising victims from the record, just as the `comfort women' have been removed.9 What is 
special is the context in which it is happening. Firstly, the victims (or their descendents) are no 
longer powerless. On the contrary, this is happening at a time when nationalism is burgeoning 
in China, and in both Koreas. Confidence is rising along with rapid economic and technological 
growth. Moreover, with the growth of democracy in various forms and the access to information 
and communication afforded by new technologies, governments are less able to contain the anger 
of their citizens. East Asians are increasingly aware of the contrast between Germany's handling 
of its past, and that of Japan. 
   Secondly, the textbooks issue is not an isolated incident. It is part of a wider pattern. Visits by 
serving prime ministers, such as Koizumi, to the Yasukuni shrine, territorial disputes with Korea 
(Tokto/Takeshima), China (Diaoyu/Senkaku) and Russia and the failure to recognise, let alone ad-
dress, the dreadful fate of `comfort women' all add up. 10 Indeed, as Gavan McCormack has noted, 
whereas German participation was taken for granted in the ceremonies marking the sixtieth an-
3 The website does, in fact, offer English translations of the table of contents and at least some small bits 
of text; see Kaleidoscope 2005. 
4 Selden 2005. 
5 Jin 2005. 
6 Beal2001. 
7 Prideaux 2005. 
8 Chosun Ilbo 2006. 
9 Nozaki 2005. 
10 Morris-Suzuki 2005.
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niversary of the end of the Second World War, it would have been inconceivable for the Japanese 
government to have been invited to the ceremonies in Beijing, Seoul, or Pyongyang; "There may 
be no other country in the world today so much at odds, on questions of history and territory, with 
all its neighbors as Japan."" A poll conducted in June 2005 found that 90% of South Koreans mis-
trusted Japan, and there is reason to think that this attitude is common through much of East Asia. 12 
In recent years there has been a plethora of public opinion surveys and the selection below gives a 
good picture of where Japan sits within the consciousness of its neighbors.
Measuring softpower by gauging attitudes 
   Public opinion surveys, as an indicator of softpower, is something which the Americans have 
pioneered and which is being taken up widely.in other countries, not least Japan. The commercial 
Gallup Poll, part of the Gallup Organization which also includes a consultancy arm, a university 
and a publisher, is probably the oldest and most famous." Whilst Gallup's polls are often reported 
in the press, the actual result are sold to clients and do not enter the public domain, in the way that 
the polls described below do. 
   The Program for International Policy attitudes at the University of Maryland focuses mainly 
on the United States and global issues that affect it. Whilst it has a section on China, it pays little 
attention to Japan. 14 
   More comprehensive, and going further back, is the Japan initiative of the Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut. The Roper Center does not conduct sur-
veys itself; rather it serves as a repository for surveys from a range of sources. Its active involve-
ment in Japan, which is funded by the United States-Japan Foundation dates from 1992 and its 
Japanese Public Opinion Database (JPOLL) contains more than 10,000 questions and responses. 
Its data library has material stretching back to 1946.15 However JPOLL concerns itself with sur-
veys in Japan does not extend to polls about Japan in Asia. 
   Perhaps the leader on a global scale in the public domain is the Pew Research Center in Wash-
ington DC. In 2001 it began a series of `Global Attitudes' public opinion surveys. By spring of 
2006 it had conducted seven such surveys, the largest of which, in summer 2002 comprised 38,263 
interview conducted in 44 nations. The questions cover a range of public policy issues (such as 
global warming) but the focus, and underlying rationale, is international attitudes to the United 
States and US foreign policy. The report on the one conducted in spring 2006 is headed "America's 
Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas."16
                    Table 1: Favorable opinions of the US 
Percentage of respondents having a favorable opinion of the US 
             1999/2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 Great Britain 83 75 70 58 55 56 
 France 62 63 43 37 43 39
11 McCormack 2005. 
12 Yomiuri 2005. 
13 Gallup Poll. 
14 Pipa 2006. 
15 Roper JPOLL 2006. 
16 Pew 2006a.
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Germany 
Spain 
Russia 
Indonesia 
Egypt 
Pakistan 
Jordan 
Turkey 
Nigeria 
Japan 
India 
China
78 
50 
37 
75 
23 
52 
46 
77
61 
61 
61 
10 
25 
30 
72 
54
45 
38 
36 
15 
13 
1 
15 
61
38 
47
21 
5 
30
41 
41 
52 
38 
23 
21 
23
71 
42
37 
23 
43 
30 
30 
27 
15 
12 
62 
63 
56 
47
Note: 1999/2000 survey trends provided by the Office of Research, US Department of State 
Source: Pew 2006a
   Of particular importance in the context of this essay is the contrast, shown in Table 1, between 
the attitude towards the US of Japanese respondents and that of those of other countries over this 
period. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 seems to lead to a very definite slump in attitudes 
towards the US in Western Europe and previously friendly Islamic countries such as Indonesia. 
This rise in Anti-Americanism is of course widely corroborated from other sources. By contrast, 
the decline in a favorable attitude towards the US does fall, from 77% in 1999/2000 to 63% in 
2006, but this is significantly less than that the decline in countries such as Britain, Germany, and 
Indonesia. The resilience of Japanese support for the United States does suggest a lack of a critical 
appraisal of American foreign policy and an indifference to the erosion of its softpower caused by 
the invasion of Iraq. This indifference is mirrored, as we see below, by the support given to given 
to Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine despite the negative impact it has on 
Japan's standing in Asia. 
   While Table 1 gives some global attitudes towards the United States, and as such is somewhat 
peripheral to Japan, the following eight tables from a set of Pew Research Center provides infor-
mation central to a discussion on Japanese softpower. On 21 September 2006 Pew released a six-
nation survey on mutual attitudes amongst Asian nations, which inevitably included their attitude 
to the United States. The six nations were China, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and the United 
States." Unfortunately South Korea was not included in the survey, although it would have been 
much more relevant than Russia.
                  Table 2: Hostility amongst Asian neighbors 
Favorability rating of 
 Opinion by Opinion on>> China Japan India Pakistan 
   China % 
               Favorable 94 28 47 69
              Unfavorable 5 71 39 7
   Japan 
               Favorable 21 77 60 43 
              Unfavorable 70 22 25 16
17 Pew 2006b.
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  India 
                 Favorable 
               Unfavorable 
  Pakistan 
                 Favorable 
               Unfavorable 
       United States 
                 Favorable 
               Unfavorable 
Source: Pew 2006b
33 
43
33 
42
47 
43
65 
28
33 
49
63 
35
23 
67
56 
28
33 
50
27 
56
   Table 2 shows that the Chinese had far less favorable attitude towards Japan (28%) than they 
did towards Pakistan (69%) or even one-time enemy, and current competitor, India (47%). The 
Japanese viewed themselves favorably (77%) though they were less pleased with themselves than 
the Chinese (94%). Japan got good ratings from both India (65%) and the United States (63%) but 
a low assessment from Pakistan (33%). It is unclear why the Pakistanis had such an unfavorable 
view of Japan. A spill-over from Chinese animosity towards Japan might be part of the reason, but 
it seems a far from sufficient explanation. 
   Table 3 indicates that two-thirds of the Japanese people oppose amending Article Nine and 
Japan becoming a `normal country.' This is consistent with other polls although the interpretation 
of such results is contested."
                         Table 3: Article Nine 
Do you favor or oppose changing Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution so that Japan could 
officially have a military and could declare war? 
           Favor Oppose Don't know/refused 
  Japan 27 67 6 
Source: Pew 2006b
   However, it is interesting that this apparent opposition to remilitarization does not translate 
into a perception at least in China (and probably also in both Koreas) that Japan poses a threat. 
As Table 4 shows, although the Chinese respondents clearly saw the United States as the major 
country of danger (58%), 22% put Japan in that position.
                       Table 4: Country of danger 
What country in the world, if any, represents the greatest danger ? 
         China N Korea US Japan Other Don't know/refused 
Russia 12 2 39 2 10 34 
China 0 * 58 22 7 13 
 Japan 39 35 .18 0 2 5 
Note: Other: for clarity, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Russia, and Taiwan, all of which had low scores, have been 
conflated and added to `other' 
Source: Pew 2006b
18 Junkerman 2006.
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   The reason that this anti-military stance does not yield a softpower benefit for Japan in 
China (and the Korean peninsula) is that the attitude of the Japanese people is ambiguous, if not 
contradictory. It might also be argued that they are myopic, not realising sufficiently how things 
at home, such as the Yasukuni Shrine visits, or textbooks, impact on Japan's reputation in Asia, or 
alternatively, not considering this to be a great importance. 
   The contrast between the Chinese and the Japanese attitude towards Prime Minister Koizumi's 
official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine shown in Table 5 is marked. The Japanese are fairly evenly 
divided, with a small majority (52%) supporting the visits. Only 4% of Chinese are shown as 
supporting the visits, with 78% opposing. The disapproval rate in South Korea is even higher, 
according to a survey conducted in March 2005 on behalf of the Seoul newspaper Dong-A Ilbo 
translated by the Mansfield Foundation (see below).19 In this survey, in which "don't know" is 
not countered, 7.7% of the 1,500 South Koreans questioned supported the visits, and 92.3 % 
opposed.20
                        Table 5: Yasukuni Shrine 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi has visited and paid tribute at the Yasukuni Shrine every year 
since taking office 
Do you support or oppose PMKoizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine? 
              Support Oppose Don't know/Refused 
 China 4 78 18 
 Japan 52 45 3 
Source: Pew 2006b
   Table 6 shows a similar disparity between Japanese and Chinese over the question of `apologies 
for the war.' 44% of Japanese thought that apologies so far were insufficient, but twice that number 
of Chinese (81 %) thought that way.
                      Table 6: Apologizing for the war 
Do you think Japan has apologized for its military actions during the 1930s and 1940s? 
                               China Japan 
 Yes, sufficiently apologized 3 40 
 No, not sufficient apology 81 44 
 No apology necessary 4 14 
 Don't know/refused 12 2 
Source: Pew 2006b
   The questioned asked of the South Koreans in the Dong-A Ilbo survey was slightly different 
and the methodology did not allow for `don't know,' strengthening the response. The question was 
"Do you think that Japan already compensated for victims of the colonial era and that the issue 
was settled? Or has the issue of compensation not yet been settled?" 95.2% answered "not yet. 1121 
The Japanese colonial period in Korea was longer than the invasion of China, and encompassed 
all Korean territory, and all Koreans living there, rather than a part as in China. We might expect a
19 Mansfield 2005b. 
20 Mansfield 2005b, Q28. 
21 Mansfield 2005b, Q31.
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stronger response from the Koreans 
   Table 7, which compares attitudes to Koizumi over four nations predictably shows the Chinese 
to have a more negative attitude than any of the others in the sample. The phrasing of the question-
"how much confidence do you have in Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro?" is a bit ambiguous
, at 
least in English, and yield a large number of those who either don't know or refuse to answer. Why 
the Indians have a low opinion of Koizumi compared with the Indonesians is unclear. 
                 Table 7: Attitude towards Koizumi Jun'ichiro
How much confidence do you have in Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro? 
           A lot Some Not so much None Don't now/ refused 
 Indonesia 7 41 19 7 26 
 India 8 22 13 17 40 
China 1 9 28 30 32 
 Japan 13 48 30 8 1 
Source: Pew 2006b
   In general, Table 8 suggests, the Chinese tend to have a negative attitude towards the Japanese, 
though it should be added that this is reciprocated. At least two of the tributes listed here with high 
scores-modern (68) and hardworking (61)-can be seen as positive. 'Male-dominated' is more 
difficult to interpret. Some might see it as a positive attribute though the phrase, in English, would 
probably be considered pejorative. 
                      Table 8: Chinese view of Japanese 
Percentage of respondents ascribing attribute 
 Competitive 74 Modem 68 Rude 57 
 Male-dominated 72 Selfish 67 Sophisticated 42 
 Arrogant 69 Nationalistic 66 Tolerant 22 
 Greedy 68 Violent 65 Honest 15 
 Inventive 68 Hardworking 61 Generous 9 
Source: Pew 2006b
   Table 9 looks are attitudes towards Japan on a spectrum from very favorable to very unfavorable 
six countries, including Japan itself. 
            Table 9: Favorable or unfavorable attitudes towards Japan 
Surveys conducted April/May 2006
          Total 
USA 66 
Russia 73 
India 60 
Pakistan 43 
China 21 
Japan 77 
Source: Pew 2006b
Favorable 
Very Somewhat 
 22 44 
 24 49 
 23 37 
 18 25 
  2 19 
 27 50
Total 
 14 
 17 
 25 
 16 
 70 
 22
Unfavorable 
Very Somewhat 
  5 9 
  5 12 
  11 14 
  8 8 
 29 41 
  2 20
Don't know/ 
    refused 
      21 
      10 
      16 
      41
     10 
1
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   Consistent with other parts of the survey is the low rating for Japan amongst Chinese, with 
a total of 70% having an unfavorable attitude. Interestingly, that Japanese have a less favorable 
attitude towards themselves than the Americans, the Russians, or the Pakistanis. 
   The Pew surveys are American drafted and reflect US concerns. What of surveys originating 
in Asia itself? One useful source is the American Mansfield Foundation which in August 2005 the 
announced that it was going to launch an Asian opinion poll database the following month. This 
would publish on the Foundation's website English translation of public opinion surveys of policy 
issued conducted in East Asia, by Asians rather than by Americans." By October 2006 they had 
published translations of 15 Japanese polls and six Korean ones. The Japan polls were mainly con-
ducted by either the Asahi Shimbun or the Nikkei. The popularity of Prime Minister Koizumi was 
a frequent issue, but opinions about visits to the Yasukuni shrine were also probed. 
   Table 10 gives the responses to five questions addressing the question of the Yasukuni Shrine. 
What is of greatest importance here is the fact that although 64% thought that visits to the shrine 
by the next Prime Minster (i.e. Abe Shinzo) would "negatively affect Japan's Asian diplomacy" a 
substantially smaller percentage were concerned about the act itself, or the nature of the shrine.
          Table 10: Asahi Shimbun August 2006 polls-selected questions 
Percentage of respondents
Approve/ Disapprove/
agree disagree
Q5. Prime Minister Koizumi paid a visit to Yasukuni
Shrine on August 15, the day that commemorates the 49 37
end of World War II. Do you think it was good that he
visited, or do you think he should not have visited?
Sa. Do you think the next prime minister should
visit Yasukuni Shrine, or do you think he should 31(20) 47(60)
not?'
Sc. Mr. A be has said-that he would not make it clear
whether he would visit Yasukuni Shrine or not. Do 32 54
you evaluate this attitude positively, or not?
Q7. If the next prime minister visits Yasukuni Shrine,
do you think it will negatively affect Japan's Asian 64 24
diplomacy, or do you not think so?
Q8. At Yasukuni Shrine, Class A War Criminals are
enshrined along with other war dead. Do you feel 41 47
uncomfortable about it, or not?
Source: Asahi 2006a
   Finally, we return to the Dong-A Ilbo survey conducted in South Korea in March 2005. Table 
11 gives the percentage of respondents who chose a particular country-and they were only al-
lowed one-with whom South Korea should have friendly relations. The question is ambiguous 
and the responses subject to varying interpretations. Were the large percentage (35.5%) who put 
North Korea at the top of the list doing that out of kinship "We are all brother Korean, North and
22 Mansfield 2005a.
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South") or out of expediency ("it is safest for us to have friendly relations with the North"). The 
same argument, slightly diluted, applies to the United Sates and to China. One might want to have 
friendly relations with a country without particularly liking its people or customs. However, the 
low ranking of Japan does surely reflect a deep animosity amongst South Koreas. 
                  Table 11: Name one country that you think
                South Korea should have friendly relations with 
Percentage of respondents
North Korea 35.5
United States 28.7
China 22.1
Japan 7.9
Others 5.9
Source: Mansfield 2005b Q 6
   The Dong-A Ilbo survey does have four questions which shed some light on the mechanism of 
softpower and how attitudes are molded and changed, or not.
                     Table 12: The origins of attitude 
What do you think has shaped the basis of your historical perspective (on Japan)? Choose one 
among the following choices that you think has influenced you the most.
Your own or family experiences 11.5
School Education 31.8
Memorial, Museums etc 10.6
Press/broadcasting Media 44.1
Movies or TV dramas/shows 2.0
Source: Mansfield 2005b Q34
   The media is claimed to be the most important source of attitudes towards Japan (44.1 %), fol-
lowed by education (31.8%). One implication of the importance of education in influencing people 
in their youth and through to adulthood is the need to consider the textbooks issue not merely in 
their negative impact on public opinion in Asia, but also of the opportunities multinational col-
laboration on textbooks can offer for a way forward.23
                Table 13: South Korea's ban on Japanese culture 
South Korea lifted its ban on importing Japanese popular culture Good 
in 1998, and has allowed increasing access to its cultural market 
for Japan since then. How do you evaluate this opening? 63.1
Source: Mansfield 2005b Q 35
Wrong
36.9
   Two thirds of Koreans surveyed approved of the lifting of the ban on Japanese culture from 
1998 (Table 13). The Dong-A Ilbo survey throughout gives a breakdown by sex, age and education 
which for reasons of space are note show here, but for this question it is worth noting that males, 
young and the better educated were more in favor of lifting of the ban.
23 People's Daily 2005.
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              Table 14: Frequency of watching Japanese programs 
Therefore, Japanese popular culture-movies, TV dramas for instance-has increasingly been 
introduced in recent years. How often do you watch Japanese movies or TV dramas? 
 Frequently 2.6 
 Sometimes 21.2 
 Rarely 30.9 
Not at all 45.3 
Source: Mansfield 2005b Q 36
   It would have been useful to have comparable data referring to other cultural imports, espe-
cially from America, but table 14 does suggest that Japanese programs are not much viewed. 
   The crucial question, in the context of softpower, is what impact this exposure to Japanese cul-
ture, however limited, has. The survey has two tables, the first for all respondents and the second 
for those who had answered `frequently' or `sometimes' to question 36.
                    Table 15: Impact of Japanese culture 
Do you think you have become friendlier towards Japan after the introduction of Japanese popular 
culture? 
 All respondents Frequent/sometime viewers 
   Yes No Don't know/ Yes No Don't know/ 
                 No response No response
   15.7 83.7 0.6 41.7 58.0 0.3 
Source: Mansfield 2005b Q37&38
   Data on impact would have to be more rigorously surveyed before any definite conclusions 
could be reached, but table 15 does suggest that exposure to foreign culture, in this case Japanese, 
does have a positive effect on attitude. Some 16% of all respondents said they have become friend-
lier towards Japan through contact with its popular culture. The more contact, it would seem, the 
more likely it was that people became friendlier. However, this does not mean the more they watch, 
the more friendly they became. And it might also be a matter that those most predisposed to being 
friendlier with Japan were more likely to watch Japanese programs. 
   It does seem plausible that greater access to Japanese culture, along with increased opportuni-
ties to visit Japan as tourists or students, will ameliorate hostile feeling in China and the Korean 
peninsula towards Japan, but the problems lie deep and are not susceptible to easy solutions. The 
surveys we have looked at illustrate that whilst Japan is by no mean alone in arousing the ire of its 
neighbors it does have special problems It also has unusual opportunities.
Why the softpower deficit? 
   Why are Japan's relations with its neighbors so bad? Here I focus on two aspects of the expla-
nation; the conflict between the imperatives of softpower and hardpower, and the undue privileg-
ing of domestic concerns over international ones. 
   CONFLICT BETWEEN SOFTPOWER AND HARDPOwER. Joseph Nye has differentiated between, and 
contrasted, `soft power' (the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to 
adopt your goals) and `hard power', the use of military and economic might. Nye argues that 
soft power is not merely often more effective than hard power, but it is also often diminished by 
excessive reliance on the other power." Nye undervalues political and economic power in the 
24 Nye 2003; Nye 2004a; Nye 2004b.
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fashioning of soft power; the message is to a large degree the product of the medium. This can 
lead to problems when the two are confused. As Gardels has pointed out, apropos of the US and 
the Islamic world, "The problem was not that angry Muslims didn't understand America, but that 
they did."25 
   Japan has difficulties, despite the investment in the likes of the Japan Foundation and Japan 
Echo, in projecting soft power, but the problems lie deeper than control of the media. Japan has im-
mense softpower potential; just consider, as two contrasting examples, its influence on French im-
pressionism and its inspiration to Asian nationalists such as Sun Yat-sen. The Japanese economy, 
and its industrial planning and management, deriving its strength not from natural endowments but 
from human resources, is one of the marvels of the modern world. Yet, when we look at modern 
Asia we see J-pop overshadowed by hallyu, the Korean wave, and the growing stature of China, 
with its skilful, and patient, political and economic diplomacy dominating the region." Ishihara 
may rail against China, but to negative effect.27 
   Because of its acceptance of the American Imperium Japan has not struggled to carve an 
independent position in the postwar world. More than that, its pursuit of hardpower within that 
framework of subservience, inevitably depletes its ability to build softpower. The drive to become 
a `normal state,' with the full freedom of military power, leading with all likelihood to nuclear 
weapons, worries its neighbors. Because that remilitarisation takes place in subordination to, and 
with the encouragement of, the United States, it necessarily is seen as threatening China, and both 
Koreas. 
   IGNORING NEAR NEIGHBOURS. Complementing this drive to hardpower is the privileging of the 
domestic ( and US) audience over the Asian one. Official visits to the Yasukuni shrine are a prime 
example. Whilst these do not win any plaudits in America, they don't appear to raise much concern 
in Washington either. Ironically, but perhaps not really surprising, one of the few American voices 
raised against the visits was that of arch-conservative Representative Hyde J. Hyde, who proposed 
that Prime Minister Koizumi not be allowed to address Congress unless he forswore visits to the 
shrine.28 
   However, given that 8 million Japanese themselves visit the Yasukuni Shrine each year, as 
well as the evidence of the polls, it is evident that official pilgrimages strike resonance with large 
segments of the electorate.29 However, there is little doubting the immense damage they do to 
Japan's image in Asia. One cannot imagine a German prime minister making a visit to a cemetery 
with Nazi connotations, however popular that might be in reality with segments of the German 
people." 
   Nor does remilitarisation raise any concerns in the United States. On the contrary it is usually 
applauded. 
   The Princeton Project on National Security which, chaired by George Shultz (Secretary of 
State under Reagan) and Anthony Lake (National Security Adviser under Clinton), might be con-
sidered an authoritative voice of the conservative, non-neocon, foreign policy elite, noted blandly
25 Gardels 2005. Nye's response at Nye 2005. 
26 Hua 2005. 
27 Ishihara 2005. 
28 JoongAng Ilbo 2006a. 
29 McGreevy 2005. 
30 It is surely significant that such a visit would cause a storm in the US, and elsewhere, whereas Yasukuni 
visits are scarcely noted.
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in its final report on the different reactions on the two sides of the Pacific.31 
       Japan's search for a mature sense of national identity and statehood and for the traditional 
       rights of sovereignty and self-defense that come with it-what some have called the "nor-
       malization of Japan"-is causing considerable concern among its neighbors, particularly 
       China and South Korea.32
   The issue of the North Korean abductions brings together both the drive for hardpower and the 
courting of domestic popularity at the expense of foreign position. As I have argued elsewhere, the 
explanation for the collapse of the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 lies in the confluence of belated 
Japanese connivance with the Bush administration's desire to destroy the Agreed Framework and 
its fear of a Tokyo-Pyongyang rapprochement, and the domestic succumbing to the temptation of 
exploiting popular anti-North Korean feeling.33
Whither Japan under Abe? 
   The coming to office of a new Prime Minister, even one with such a high-profile reputation 
as a hardliner as Abe Shinzo, offers Japan the opportunity to learn from past mistakes and then 
go down new, and wiser, paths. Although he comes from a very political family-his father, Abe 
Shintaro was Foreign Minister under Nakasone Yasuhiro and was the son-in-law of Prime Minister 
Kishi Nobusuke-he does not come into office in direct succession to his father, like Kim Jong 11, 
or at one remove like George W. Bush or Lee Hsien Loong . This gives him a certain freedom of 
action, if he so requires. As with Nixon's approach to China in the 1970s, `impeccable right wing 
connections' can enable him to do things which would be dangerous for a politician with a more 
leftist reputation. The fact that his first official visit since assuming office was to be China seems 
to have escaped criticism; an editorial in the Daily Yomiuri, for instance, merely commented that it 
would `test his diplomatic mettle.'34 Nor are the Americans likely to be concerned. On the contrary, 
as Jeff Kingston put it in the Japan Times, 
       He talks of strengthening the U.S. relationship, but knows that Washington is very con-
       cerned that Japan is gratuitously alienating China. This comes at a time when America is 
       trying to cultivate China as a stakeholder in the international system. 
       For Abe, the road to better ties with Washington, and resolution of the North Korean 
       impasse, leads through Beijing.35 
   The `gratuitously alienating,' Kingston makes quite clear, are the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
which he regards the biggest mistake of Koizumi's tenure. 
   A interestingly different approach was taken, in the same issue of the Japan Times, by David 
Howell, a former British Cabinet minister. He warmly applauded Abe's remilitarization policy 
and modestly assuring us that he is speaking for the `People in the West' he wrote "they like what 
they hear from Abe about Japan becoming fully qualified as a normal nation and as a responsible 
global player, and about engagement with giant neighbour China, although very much on a firm, 
no-nonsense basis."36 Howell, apparently not realizing how important the Yasukuni issue is on the 
31 Lobe 2006. 
32 Ikenberry 2006. 
33 Bea12005, pp. 341-362. 
34 Yomiuri 2006. 
35 Kingston 2006. 
36 Howell 2006.
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Korean peninsula suggested that the uproar in China was perhaps a concoction of the government, 
       "After all, no one really knows anyway whether China is just being awkward over spe-
       cific issues, like the delicate question of visits to Yasukuni Shrine, or whether the rulers 
       in Beijing would carry on being hostile anyway, picking quarrels on other matters, even 
       if the shrine did not exist."37
   Even if there is some confusion in Britain, Abe can be in no illusion about the strength of 
feeling in East Asia about the Yasukuni shrine. North Korea has not been happy about the prospect 
of Abe Shinzo becoming Prime Minister." Taiwan was enthusiastic, anticipating a tougher line 
on China." However the press in China and in South Korea was cautiously welcoming.40 There 
was little illusion about his position on various issues and the rightwing Seoul paper advised that 
"Realpolitik Is the Only Way Forward With Japan. 1141 A constant theme was the issue of visits to 
the Yasukuni shrine; "South Korea has once again reminded Japan that the two sides could hardly 
mend fences if the latter's new leader visits Yasukuni Shrine and Tokyo said it understands Seoul's 
position."42 Abe, for his part, declined to commit himself either way." 
   Eventually, of course, he will have to decide whether to visit or not. While he stays away it is 
likely that the relative honeymoon with Seoul and Beijing will continue.44 If he does make an of-
ficial visit it is likely that relations will quickly sink to Koizumi-era levels, or below. 
   However, Yasukuni is symbol, remilitarization is substance. Even if Abe Shinzo refrains from 
antagonizing Japan's neighbors by making official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the substantive 
issues will remain. Territorial disputes with South Korea and China are unlikely to go away or be 
resolved. The last of the Comfort Women may die, but their memory will remain. What will hap-
pen next time the textbooks are revised? Looming over all these is the issue of remilitarization, of 
Japan becoming a `normal country', of amending Article Nine, of putting its already considerable 
military capability on a more offensive posture. Ultimately, the increasingly strong prospect of 
acquiring nuclear weapons. 
   It is hugely unfortunate that Abe's entry into office coincided with North Korea's first test of a 
nuclear device. There will be the temptation, and the pressure, for Japan to go nuclear. Some think 
this is unlikely." Many are less sanguine.46 
   Japan, with its rich culture, its `Peace Constitution', and its economy still relatively unen-
cumbered by a military-industrial complex, could be a power for peace in East Asia, balancing the 
US and China, and inspiring the region and the wider world. Its softpower could be formidable. 
However, there is no indication at the moment that Japan, its ruling elite, or the electorate itself is 
facing up to the issue of the sacrificing of softpower for the chimera of hardpower and domestic 
self-absorption.
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